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Abstract— In the highly interconnected realm of Internet of
Things, exchange of sensitive information raises severe privacy
concerns. The Laplace mechanism – adding Laplace-distributed
artificial noise to sensitive data – is one of the widely used
methods of providing privacy guarantees within the framework
of differential privacy. In this work, we present Lipschitz
privacy, a slightly tighter version of differential privacy. We
prove that the Laplace mechanism is optimal in the sense
that it minimizes the mean-squared error for identity queries
which provide privacy with respect to the `1-norm. In addition
to the `1-norm which respects individuals’ participation, we
focus on the use of the `2-norm which provides privacy of
high-dimensional data. A variation of the Laplace mechanism
is proven to have the optimal mean-squared error from the
identity query. Finally, the optimal mechanism for the scenario
in which individuals submit their high-dimensional sensitive
data is derived.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) envisions that everyday
devices such as smartphones, power meters, and household
appliances will exchange information and provide innovative
services such as e-health and assisted living [1]. However,
when a device communicates sensitive information (e.g.
monitored activities, health records) over a vast network of
interconnected things, privacy concerns are raised [2]. For
example, traffic maps can be constructed from aggregating
users’ GPS traces and users can benefit from such published
maps by avoiding congested routes. On the other hand
publishing statistics of sensitive data of a population while
providing privacy guarantees is not trivial. The Netflix prize
is an example were, given publicly released information
[3], an adversary can partially reconstruct private data [4].
Accurate, privacy-preserving mechanisms are essential for
IoT to provide these services while respecting individuals’
privacy [5]
Significant efforts have been made to address these
privacy concerns [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. Intu-
itively, uncertainty about the private data is introduced by
publishing a perturbed response instead of the exact one. In
the context of traffic monitoring, virtual trip lines and data
cloaking techniques [13], [14] provide privacy against a given
adversarial model. In practice, though, an adversary may
be more powerful or informed than the model assumptions.
Additionally, an information-theoretic framework based on
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mutual information was introduced [15]. However, this ap-
proach provides privacy guarantees in a probabilistic sense
and, therefore, rare, but severe, privacy breaches are possible.
A rigorous notion of privacy is differential privacy which
provides formal privacy guarantees without any assumptions
on the adversary’s power [16] and is the notion used in
this work. Specifically, while answering queries from private
data, artificial noise is injected. This noise is deliberately
designed and ensures that an adversary cannot confidently
infer any individual’s private data, where an adjacency
relation defines the pairs of inputs that are rendered almost
indistinguishable. For tight privacy level, increased amounts
of noise are required and, consequently, the accuracy of the
noisy response degrades. Thus, a trade-off between privacy
level and accuracy exists. Ideally, one would like to design
optimal mechanisms that satisfy a predefined privacy level
and approximate a given query with minimum mean-squared
error.
Several methods for constructing differentially private
mechanisms have been proposed. In particular, given a score
function for every pair of private input and public response,
the exponential mechanism [17] provides a powerful way
of building a private mechanism, although no performance
guarantees were initially provided. The Laplace mechanism
is an instance of the exponential mechanism for real, vector-
valued private data which adds Laplace-distributed noise V
to the private data:
P(V = v) ∝ e−‖v‖1 , (1)
where  ∈ (0,∞) is the privacy level — smaller values of
parameter  result to stronger privacy guarantees — and ‖·‖1
is the `1-norm. Near-optimality of the Laplace mechanism
for a single integer-valued linear query was presented in [18],
whereas, for linear queries, asymptotic (in the number of
users) sub-optimality bounds were derived for a variant of
the Laplace mechanism [19]. For single-dimensional private
data, the exact optimality of the “staircase” mechanism, a
quantized version of the Laplace mechanism, was established
in [20]. Moreover, the Laplace mechanism was proven to
be an entropy-minimizing private mechanism [21] under a
version of differential privacy for metric spaces [22].
In this work, we establish optimality guarantees for
the Laplace mechanism – adding Laplace-distributed noise
(1). We formalize Lipschitz privacy which is a slightly
stronger version of differential privacy for metric spaces
and allows us to pose the problem of designing optimal
privacy-aware mechanisms as optimization problems where
privacy requirements are included as constraints. We, first,
prove that the Laplace mechanism optimally approximates
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real-valued private data by achieving the minimum mean-
squared error. Besides the `1-norm used in (1), we focus
on the `2-norm as the appropriate adjacency relation that
captures the privacy aspects of sensitive signals, such as
GPS and power consumption traces. In the `2-norm case, we
prove the optimality of a variant of the Laplace mechanism.
Furthermore, we extend our optimality results to the case of a
composite adjacency relation for the scenario when multiple
individuals contribute their private signals, e.g. drivers report
their GPS traces.
A brief overview of differential privacy is provided in
Section II. In Section III, a version of differential privacy
for Euclidean spaces is explored and strong connections with
differential privacy are established. Section IV establishes the
optimal private mechanism for the case of multi-dimensional
identity queries both under `1 and `2 norms. We conclude
this work with a discussion in Section V.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY OVERVIEW
The framework of differential privacy was introduced in
[23], [16]. According to this framework, whenever a query
is submitted to private data, the exact response must be
perturbed by noise upon release to the public. Formally, the
definition of differential privacy is the following:
Definition 1: Let  ≥ 0 be a given privacy level, U be the
set of possible private data, A ⊆ U2 be an adjacency relation
over the private data, Y be the set of possible responses, and
∆ (Y) be the set of probability measures over (a sufficiently
rich σ-algebra of) Y . A mechanism Q : U → ∆ (Y) is -
differentially private if
P(Qu ∈ S) ≤ eP(Qu′ ∈ S)
for every S ⊆ Y and every u, u′ ∈ U such that (u, u′) ∈ A.
Remark 1: For a given output set Y , we assume the
existence of a rich enough σ-algebra M ⊆ 2Y . Slightly
abusing of notation, we write S ⊆ Y instead of S ∈M . Also,
the set of probability measures over (Y,M) is denoted by
∆ (Y). For a finite set of responses Y , we assume M = 2Y .
In this approach, we focus on Euclidean spaces Y = Rm
and the Borel set M = Bm.
Definition 1 considers randomized mappings, called
mechanisms, from private data in U to responses in Y . The
adjacency relation A defines the pairs of inputs (u, u′) that
are rendered almost indistinguishable to an adversary who
observes only the response of the mechanism. The level of
privacy is controlled by the parameter  ≥ 0. Complete
privacy is guaranteed for  = 0, whereas, no privacy is
respected for  → ∞. A differential private algorithm is
a map from private data to distributions over the set of
responses. Upon release, the differential private response is
given by a single random sample drawn from the distribution.
A differential private mechanism needs to be useful at
the same time. For example, a mechanism that responds
identically for any input is 0-differential private, but also
useless. To this end, we are interested in mechanisms Q
that approximate a given query q : U → Y . We say
that an -differential private mechanism is optimal (in the
mean-squared sense) if it minimizes the mean-squared error
of the desired query q. Characterization of the optimal
private mechanism is fundamental for efficient applications
of differential privacy.
In this work, we present optimal private mechanisms for
identity queries under a general adjacency relation. Specif-
ically, we focus on Euclidean spaces and assume each of
the n users contributes his m-dimensional sensitive data. Let
U = Rn×m and Y = Rn×m and consider the adjacency
relation A defined as:
(u, u′) ∈ A ⇔ ∃i s.t. ‖ui − u′i‖2 ≤ α and uj = u′j ,∀j 6= i.
(2)
Adjacency relation (2) respects privacy of every individual’s
sensitive data ui; even if an adversary is aware of every other
user’s data uj , j 6= i, the adversary cannot confidently extract
the value ui.
III. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AS LIPSCHITZ CONSTRAINT
In this section, we reformulate differential privacy for
metric spaces as a Lipschitz constraint. This reformulation,
which we call Lipschitz privacy, is closely related to the
original notion of differential privacy introduced in [22]. In
particular, the differential privacy constraint is viewed as a
sensitivity constraint. The sensitive data is assumed to be
an element of a complete vector space U equipped with a
norm ‖ · ‖, and the set of possible responses is denoted by
Y . Formally, we provide the definition of Lipschitz privacy:
Definition 2 (Lipschitz privacy): Let U be a metric space
and Y be a set of responses. A mechanism Q : U → ∆ (Y) is
called -Lipshcitz differentially private if the log-probability
function is -Lipschitz:
| lnP(Qu ∈ S)− lnP(Qu′ ∈ S)| ≤ ‖u− u′‖,
∀u, u′ ∈ U and S ⊆ Y. (3)
In practical applications, the space of private data U =
Rn is Euclidean equipped with the `p-norm. Assuming
the mechanism Q possesses a probability density function
g(u, y) = P(Qu = y), where g(u, y) is almost everywhere
differentiable in u, the Lipschitz condition (3) translates to
a point-wise bound on the derivative across the private input
u as follows:
g(·, y) is continuous for all y ∈ Y and,
‖∇g(u, y)‖∗ ≤ g, for a.e. u ∈ U and all y ∈ Y,
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖.
A. A Metric as Adjacency Relation
The adjacency relation A in differential privacy is re-
placed by the metric ‖ · ‖ of the space U of private data.
The composite adjacency relation (2) can be captured using
`1 and `2-norms. Specifically, assume that the private data
u = [u1, . . . , un] is an aggregation of n individuals’ high-
dimensional data ui ∈ Rm. Then, adjacency relation (2) can
be relaxed to:
(u, u′) ∈ A ⇔
n∑
i=1
‖ui − u′i‖2 ≤ α. (4)
According to the Lipschitz-privacy framework and assuming
existence and differentiability of the density of the mecha-
nism, adjacency relation (4) translates into a bound on the
derivative of the mechanism:
‖∇ui ln g(u, y)‖2 ≤ , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5)
Adjacency relation (5) can be viewed as an `2-sensitivity
constraint that ensures privacy of high-dimensional data. This
constraint is encapsulated in an `1-sensitivity constraint that
respects individuals’ participation in the scheme. Addition-
ally, this expression ensures that privacy of individuals’ sen-
sitive data remains invariant under rotation transformations
on the high-dimensional data ui. This invariance is important
in many theoretical and practical case such as privacy of
the state of dynamical systems and privacy of GPS traces,
respectively.
B. Connections between Lipschitz and Differential Privacy
The notion of Lipschitz privacy is closely related to that
of differential privacy. Particularly, an -Lipschitz private
mechanism is also differential private.
Proposition 3: For any α > 0. Then, an -Lipschitz
private mechanism Q is α-differentially private:
P(Qu ∈ S) ≤ eP(Qu′ ∈ S),∀u, u′ : ‖u− u′‖ ≤ α.
Many popular differentially private mechanisms, such
as the Laplace and the exponential mechanism, are also
Lipschitz-differentially private. One exception that fails to
satisfy Lipschitz-privacy constraints is the staircase mecha-
nism [20], since the underlying noise distribution is discon-
tinuous. Specifically, the log-probability function lnP(Qu =
y) is discontinuous and, hence, is not Lipschitz.
Proposition 4: Let s : U × Y → R be L-Lipschitz in U .
Then, the mechanism Q with density
P(Qu = y|u) ∝ es(u,y)
is L-Lipschitz differentially private.
In the special case where U = Y = Rn and s(u, y) =
−‖u−y‖p, we recover the Laplace mechanism. Furthermore,
Lipschitz privacy inherits the property of resiliency to post-
processing. Identically to differential privacy, any further,
possibly randomized, post-processing of the output carries
the same privacy guarantees.
Proposition 5 (Post-processing): Consider an -
Lipschitz differentially private mechanism Q : U → ∆ (Y)
and a post-processing of the output f : Y → Z . Then, the
mechanism f ◦Q is -Lipschitz differentially private.
Propositions 3-5 establish that Lipschitz-differential pri-
vacy is a stricter version of differential privacy. Lipschitz
privacy has some benefits over the original framework.
Firstly, the privacy constraint is simplified; the adjacency
relation is now captured by the metric of the space of private
data. Furthermore, Lipschitz-differential privacy enables the
use of calculus tools in designing and proving properties
of mechanisms. Additionally, it provides a unified privacy
framework that can support richer privacy-aware applica-
tions. Privacy is now viewed as a sensitivity constraint on
the mapping between private inputs and published outputs.
IV. OPTIMAL PRIVATE MECHANISMS
In this section, the optimality of the Laplace mechanism
is proven. Specifically, we prove that the Laplace mechanism
minimizes the mean-squared error among all private mecha-
nisms that use additive and input-independent noise. Initially,
the result is derived for the case of a single-dimensional
identity query. Next, the result is extended to the case of
isotropic multi-dimensional queries under both `1 and `2
norms. The `1-norm respects individuals’ participation in the
aggregation scheme and is related to event counting queries
[24]. Moreover, the `2-norm is invariant under rotations and
is more suitable for high-dimensional private data such as
GPS signals and power consumption traces. Finally, the
optimal mechanism for the case of multiple individuals
contributing their high-dimensional sensitive data is derived
from the results for `1 and `2 norms.
A. Single-Dimensional Identity Query
The exponential mechanism introduced in [17] is a
general way of building privacy-preserving mechanisms. Be-
sides the exponential mechanism, specific mechanisms that
approximate linear, high-dimensional queries were explored
in [24]. However, no optimality guarantees were provided.
Under the original framework of differential privacy the stair-
case mechanism [20] is optimal for one-dimensional identity
queries in the sense of mean-squared error. Asymptotic
bounds on the sub-optimality of mechanisms approximating
linear queries were introduced [19]. In this approach, we
are interested in exact optimality results. Specifically, we
provide a proof of the optimality of the Laplace mechanism
for the case of single-dimensional identity queries. In [21],
the Laplace mechanism is proven to be an entropy-minimizer.
In this work, we provide a proof that the Laplace mechanism
achieves the minimal mean-squared error. In the following
subsections, this result is extended to high-dimensional cases.
Initially, we focus on single-dimensional private data
and Lipschitz-private mechanisms that add oblivious noise.
In this setting, the mean-squared error is minimized when
the noise is Laplace-distributed. The problem of design-
ing the optimal private mechanism is initially posed as
an infinite-dimensional linear program. Optimality of the
Laplace distribution is proven by deriving the dual problem
and constructing a dual feasible solution. In particular, the
space of private data is the real line U = R equipped with
the absolute value as a metric. We approximate the identity
query q(u) = u with an -Lipschitz private mechanism Q
that adds input-independent noise with probability measure
g:
Qu = u+ V, where V ∼ g ∈ ∆ (R) ,
where ∆(Y) denotes the set of probability measures over
the set Y . The following result establishes the optimality of
Laplace distribution.
Theorem 6: Consider the set of -Lipschitz private mech-
anisms Q : R→ ∆ (R), Qu = u+ V , that approximate the
identity query q : R→ R, q(u) = u, where noise V is input-
independent and has probability distribution g. The Laplace
mechanism that adds noise with density l(v) = 2e
−|v|
achieves the minimal mean-squared error:
E (Qu− q(u))2 = E
V∼g
V 2 ≥ E
V∼l
V 2 =
2
2
.
Proof: A simplified but intuitive sketch of the proof is
presented here. A full proof is presented in the Appendix.
By definition, the optimal mechanism is the solution of the
following optimization problem:
minimize
g∈∆(R)
E
V∼g
V 2
s.t. Q is -Lipschitz private.
(6)
The optimization is assumed over the infinite-dimensional
space of probability measures over the real line. For a sim-
plified proof, we restrict our attention to probability measures
that are continuous and almost everywhere differentiable.
This assumption is removed in the technical proof. The
privacy constraint is massaged:
Q is -Lipschitz private ⇒∣∣∣∣ ddu lnP(Qu = y)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ , ∀u, y ⇔∣∣∣∣ dduP(V = y − u)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ P(V = y − u), ∀u, y ⇔
|g′(v)| ≤ g(v), ∀v.
Specifically, g should be continuous and g′ should exist
almost everywhere. Problem (6) can, then, be restated as a
linear program:
minimize
g:AC(R→R+)
∫
R
v2g(v)dv
s.t.
∫
R
g(v)dv = 1,
− g(v) ≤ g′(v) ≤ g(v), ∀v ∈ R,
(7)
where AC denotes the set of absolutely continuous functions.
Problem (7) is an infinite-dimensional linear program with
uncountably many constraints. We assign the dual variables
λ ∈ R and κ, µ : R → R+ for the two constraints,
respectively. The dual of Problem (7) is:
maximize
λ∈R,η∈C1(R→R)
λ
s.t. η′(v) + |η(v)| ≤ v2 − λ, ∀v ∈ R,
lim
v→∞ η(v) ≥ 0, limv→−∞ η(v) ≤ 0.
(8)
Once both primal Problem (7) and dual Problem (8) are
stated, we construct primal and dual feasible solutions,
summon weak duality, and establish optimality. The Laplace
distribution g(v) = 2e
−|v| is a primal feasible solution for
Problem (7) with cost 22 . Moreover, we construct a dual
feasible solution for Problem (8) with cost arbitrarily close
to λ∗ = 22 . Specifically, for any λ < λ
∗, we are able to
construct a dual feasible solution (λ, η) that satisfies the
initial value problem:
η(0) = 0 and η′(v) + |η(v)| = v2 − λ, ∀v ∈ R\{0}. (9)
Figure 1 plots the unique solution η : R → R of the initial
value problem (9) for different values of λ. For λ < λ∗, the
unique solution η of the initial value problem (9) is feasible
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Fig. 1: The dual variable η(v) is the solution to the intial value
problem η′(v) + |η(v)| = v2 − λ, η(0) = 0 for different values
of λ. A feasible solution needs to satisfy the boundary constraint
limv→∞ η(v) ≥ 0. For λ < λ∗, the solution η is feasible.
since it satisfies the boundary constraints:
lim
v→∞ η(v) ≥ 0, limv→−∞ η(v) ≤ 0.
On the contrary, the dual variable η is infeasible for λ ≥ λ∗.
Weak duality establishes the optimality of the Laplace mech-
anism. Surprisingly, the dual solution η(v) = − 12 v(|v|+2)
for the optimal value λ∗ is infeasible. The infinite dimension-
ality of the problem leads to an open set of feasible solutions
for problem (8) and generates this paradox.
The staircase mechanism [20] can be viewed as an ap-
proximation of the Laplace mechanism. Although it features
better mean-squared error than the Laplace mechanism, the
staircase mechanism is not -Lipschitz private for any finite
value of . Thus, the staircase mechanism is not a feasible
solution to Problem (6).
B. High-Dimensional Identity Query under `1-norm
Differential privacy is mainly targeted for schemes where
individuals contribute their personal data to a single database.
In such schemes, the sensitive data u contains each individ-
ual’s private data ui at coordinate i. Here, we extend the pre-
vious results to high-dimensional identity queries. Privacy-
aware approximation of identity queries can be interpreted as
synthetic databases which are post-processed to answer any
subsequent query. More formally, let the space of sensitive
data be the real space U = Rn equipped with the `1-norm.
We focus on the case of identity queries q : Rn → Rn with
q(u) = u. A generalized version of Theorem 6 establishes
optimality of the Laplace mechanism:
Theorem 7: Consider the -Lipschitz private (with re-
spect to the `1-norm) mechanism Q : Rn → ∆ (Rn) of
the form Qu = u+V , with V ∼ g(V ) ∈ ∆ (Rn). Then, the
Laplace mechanism that adds oblivious noise with density
g = ln1 (v) =
(

2
)n
e−‖v‖1 minimizes mean-squared error:
E
V∼g
‖V ‖2 ≥ E
V∼ln1
‖V ‖22 =
2n
2
.
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Theorem 6, the optimal
mechanism is the solution of the following optimization
problem:
minimize
g:AC(Rn→R+)
∫
Rn
g(v)vT vdv
s.t.
∫
Rn
g(v)dv = 1,
‖∇g(v)‖∞ ≤ g(v), ∀v ∈ Rn.
(10)
The last constraint is equivalent to
−g(v) ≤ ∂g
∂vi
≤ g(v), ∀v ∈ Rn, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We consider the dual variables λ ∈ R and κi, µi : Rn → R+,
set ηi(v) = µi(v)− κi(v), and derive the dual problem:
maximize
λ∈R,ηi∈C1(Rn→R)
λ
s.t.
n∑
i=1
{
∂ηi
∂vi
+ |ηi(v)|
}
≤
n∑
i=1
v2i − λ,
lim
vi→∞
ηi(v) ≥ 0, lim
vi→−∞
ηi(v) ≤ 0, ∀i.
(11)
The solution g(v) =
(

2
)n
e−‖v‖1 is feasible for the primal
Problem (10) and features cost 2n2 . A feasible solution for
the dual Problem (11) is defined as:
ηi(v) = η1D(vi), λ = nλ1D,
where (λ1D, η1D) is a feasible dual solution for the single-
dimensional case given by the initial value problem (9).
Therefore, the dual Problem (11) admits a feasible solution
with cost arbitrarily close to 2n2 . Weak duality establishes
the optimality of the Laplace mechanism.
C. High-Dimension Identity Query under `2-norm
Differential privacy with respect to the `1-norm captures
privacy against the participation of individual users. The
`2-norm is a more suitable for users that contribute high-
dimensional data such as GPS and power consumption traces.
Once again, a version of the Laplace mechanism is proven to
achieve minimum mean-squared-error among all -Lipschitz
private mechanisms that approximate the identity query by
adding oblivious noise:
Theorem 8: Consider the -Lipschitz private (with re-
spect to the `2-norm) mechanism Q : Rn → ∆ (Rn) of
the form Qu = u + V , with V ∼ g ∈ ∆ (Rn). Then,
the Laplace mechanism that adds noise V with density
g = ln2 (v) ∝ e−‖v‖2 minimizes the mean-squared error:
E
V∼g
‖V ‖2 ≥ E
V∼ln2
‖V ‖22 =
n(n+ 1)
2
.
Proof: Once again, the optimal private mechanism is
posed as an optimization problem:
minimize
g:AC(Rn→R+)
∫
Rn
g(v) vT v dnv
s.t.
∫
Rn
g(v)dnv = 1,
∇g(v) · aˆ ≤ g(v), for a.e. v ∈ Rn,
∀aˆ ∈ Rn, ‖aˆ‖2 = 1,
(12)
where the last constraint is equivalent to the privacy con-
straint ‖∇g(v)‖∗2 ≤ g(v). Consider the dual variables λ ∈ R
and κ : Rn×Sn−1 → R+, where Sn−1 = {aˆ ∈ Rn : ‖aˆ‖2 =
1}. Moreover, set η(v) = κ(v)−µ(v), and formulate the dual
problem of Problem (12):
maximize
λ∈R,κ∈Rn×Sn−1→R+
λ
s.t. ∇ ·
(∫
Sn
aˆκ(v, aˆ)daˆ
)
+ 
∫
Sn
κ(v, aˆ)daˆ ≤ vT v − λ,
lim
‖v‖2→∞
∫
Sn
aˆ · v κ(v, aˆ)daˆ ≥ 0.
(13)
A feasible solution for the primal problem (12) is:
g(v) =
nΓ
(
n
2 + 1
)
pi
n
2 Γ(n+ 1)
e−‖v‖2 , (14)
with mean-squared error λ∗ = n(n+1)2 . On the other hand,
there exists a dual feasible solution for Problem (13) with
cost arbitrarily close to λ∗. Consider a dual feasible solution
of the form:
κ(v, aˆ) = [η(‖v‖2)]+ δ
(
aˆ+
v
‖v‖2
)
+ [η(‖v‖2)]− δ
(
aˆ− v‖v‖2
)
,
where δ is Dirac’s delta function on the unit n-sphere Sn−1,
η : R+ → R is a suitable function, and [·]+ and [·]− are
the positive and negative parts of a function, respectively.
Then, we can reduce the feasible region of Problem (13)
and rewrite it as
maximize
λ∈R,η:R+→R
λ
s.t. η′(r) +
n− 1
r
η(r) + |η(r)| ≤ r2 − λ
lim
r→∞ η(r) ≥ 0.
(15)
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 7, a feasible solution (λ, η)
of Problem (15) of the following form is constructed:
η′(r) +
n− 1
r
η(r) + |η(r)| = r2 − λ and η(0) = 0(16)
Figure 2 shows the solution of the initial value problem (16)
for different values of λ. For λ < λ∗, the solution is feasible
and, thus, the optimality of the density (14) for the initial
value problem (12) is established.
Again, for λ = λ∗, the dual solution η(r) = − r(r+n+1)2
is infeasible as a result of the infinite-dimensional nature of
problem (16).
Sample from distribution (14) can be efficiently gener-
ated. The magnitude r = ‖v‖2 of the noise is drawn from
the Gamma distribution r ∼ nΓ(n)e−rrn−1 and the direction
vˆ = v‖v‖2 is uniformly sampled from the sphere S
n−1.
D. Multiple Users with High-Dimensional Private Data
In this section, the case of multiple users contributing
their high-dimensional sensitive data is explored. Specifi-
cally, consider n individuals. Each individual contributes his
m-dimensional sensitive data ui ∈ Rn, n ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Furthermore, we are interested in releasing a privacy-aware
version of the sensitive data under an adjacency relation that
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Fig. 2: The dual variable η(v) is the solution to the intial value
problem η′(r)+ n−1
r
η(r)+|η(r)| = r2−λ, η(0) = 0 for different
values of λ. A feasible solution needs to satisfy the boundary
constraint limv→∞ η(v) ≥ 0. For λ < λ∗, the solution η is feasible.
preserves both individual’s participation and each user’s data.
These aspects of privacy are captured by adjacency relation
(4) derived earlier.
In particular, let the space of private data be U =
Rn·m and consider private mechanisms Q that add input-
independent noise V ∼ g to the private data u. Similarly
to the previous case, a version of the Laplace mechanism
provides the optimal mean-squared error.
Theorem 9: Consider the -Lipschitz private (with re-
spect to the adjacency relation (4)) mechanism Q : Rn·m →
∆ (Rn·m) of the form Qu = u+V , with V ∼ g ∈ ∆ (Rn·m).
Then, the Laplace mechanism that adds oblivious noise with
density g = ln,m(v) ∝ e−
∑n
i=1 ‖vi‖2 minimizes the mean-
squared-error:
E
V∼g
‖V ‖2 ≥ E
V∼ln,m
‖V ‖22 =
nm(m+ 1)
2
.
Proof: The primal optimization problems is as follows
minimize
g:AC(Rn·m→R+)
∫
Rn·m
g(v)vT vdv
s.t.
∫
Rn·m
g(v)dv = 1,
‖∇ig(v)‖2 ≤ g(v), ∀i ∈ [n],∀v ∈ Rn,
where ∇ig =
[
∂g
∂v(i−1)·m+1
. . . ∂g∂vi·m
]
and [n] =
{1, . . . , n}. The dual problem is formulated:
maximize
λ∈R,ηi:R+→R
λ
s.t.
n∑
i=1
{
η′i(ri) +
n− 1
ri
ηi(ri) + |ηi(ri)|
}
≤
n∑
i=1
r2i − λ, and lim
ri→∞
ηi(ri) ≥ 0, ∀i
A pair of feasible primal and dual solutions is constructed:
g =
(
mΓ(m2 + 1)
mpi
m
2 Γ(m)
)n
e−
∑n
i=1 ‖vi‖2 ,
ηi(ri) = η`2(ri), and λ = nλ`2 ,
where (λ`2 , η`2) is the dual solution of Theorem 8. Weak
duality establishes the optimality of the solution.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work, we explored Lipschitz privacy, which is
a version of differential privacy that is adapted for metric
spaces. Moreover, we proved that, for a given privacy level,
the Laplace mechanism minimizes the mean-squared error
among all single-dimensional mechanisms that add input-
independent noise. The design of the optimal private mech-
anism is initially formulated as a linear program. Then,
the optimality of the Laplace mechanism is established by
constructing a pair of primal and dual feasible solutions
with zero duality gap. Next, the result is extended to high-
dimensional real spaces equipped with the `1-norm. The case
of `1-norm corresponds to the case of providing privacy
guarantees with respect to participation of any individual.
Furthermore, the optimality of a variation of the Laplace
mechanism is established for real spaces equipped with the
`2-norm. In this case, the privacy guarantees are invariant
under rotations and, thus, this choice of norm captures
the case where every individual provides high-dimensional
sensitive data. A combination of the two results provides
the optimal privacy-aware approximation of the aggregation
of high-dimensional sensitive data of multiple individuals.
Future directions include optimality guarantees for more
general classes of queries beyond identity queries. Moreover,
it is useful to study optimality results for other composite
adjacency relations such as that proposed in [25].
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APPENDIX
Theorem 6 establishes the optimality of the Laplace
mechanism for a single-dimensional identity query. A more
technical proof is presented here. First, we prove that, for
Lipschitz differential privacy guarantees to hold, the additive
noise should possess density.
Lemma 10: Consider the -Lipschitz private mechanism
Q that uses oblivious, additive noise V . Specifically, let
Qu = u+ V , where V has probability measure g ∈ ∆ (V ).
Then V possesses density.
Proof: We prove that the cumulative density function
G of V
G(x) = P(V ≤ x)
is absolutely continuous. For any measurable S ⊆ R and any
u1, u2 ∈ R, Lipschitz privacy dictates that:
|lnP(Qu1 ∈ S)− lnP(Qu2 ∈ S)| ≤ |u1 − u2|
Let S = (−∞, 0], u1 = −x, and u2 = −y, with x < y.
Then:
|lnP(V ≤ x)− lnP(V ≤ y)| ≤ |x− y| ⇒
|P(V ≤ x)− P(V ≤ y)| ≤ P(V ≤ x)|x− y| ⇒
|G(x)−G(y)| ≤ |x− y|
Therefore, G is absolutely continuous and, hence, V pos-
sesses density. Abusing notation, we denote the density of
the noise V with g.
We now provide a technical proof of Theorem 6.
Proof: Consider the -Lipschitz differential private mech-
anisms that use additive, oblivious noise V with probability
measure g:
Q : R→ ∆(R), Qu = u+ V, where V ∼ g.
Solving for the optimal, in the mean-squared error sense,
probability measure is posed as a linear, but infinite-
dimensional program:
minimize
g∈∆(R)
E
V∼g
V 2
s.t. g is -Lipschitz diff. private
(17)
Lemma 10 establishes that V possesses density which is
abusively denoted by g(v). Therefore, Problem (17) is equiv-
alently written as:
minimize
g:C1(R→R)
∫
R
g(v)v2dv
s.t.
∫
R
g(v)dv = 1, and g(v) ≥ 0, ∀v,
− g(v) ≤ lim inf
δ→0
g(v + δ)− g(v)
δ
, ∀v
lim sup
δ→0
g(v + δ)− g(v)
δ
≤ g(v), ∀v.
(18)
Problem (18) is an infinite-dimensional linear program with
infinite many constraints, thus, it is unclear though whether
the minimum is achievable. The Laplace distribution l(v) =

2e
−|v| is a feasible solution with mean error 22 . We now
discritize, dualize and take limits in order to compute the
dual problem. As a result, we prove that the dual variable
is differentiable and we retrieve the formulation of the dual
problem. Consider N discrete points:
vi = −M + i · ν, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
where ν = 2MN−1 is the discritization step and M is the
truncation limit. For gi = g(vi), the original optimization
is problem is now approximated by its discritized version:
minimize
{gi}Ni=1∈RN
N∑
i=1
giv
2
i ν
s.t.
N∑
i=1
giν = 1, and gi ≥ 0, ∀i,
−  · gi + gi+1
2
≤ gi+1 − gi
ν
≤  · gi + gi+1
2
, ∀i.
Let λ ∈ R, and κi, µi ∈ R+ with i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} be
the dual variables for the first and the second constraint,
respectively. The Lagrangian of the optimization problem is
computed and minimized over {gi}Ni=1 ∈ RN+ :
L(g, λ, κ, µ) =
N∑
i
giv
2
i ν + λ− λ
N∑
i=1
giν
+
N−1∑
i=1
[
−κi gi + gi+1
2
− κi gi+1 − gi
ν
]
+
N−1∑
i=1
[
µi
gi+1 − gi
ν
− µi gi + gi+1
2
]
Thus, the dual problem is the following:
maximize
λ,{κi},{µi}
λ
s.t. 
κi−1 + κi
2
+ 
µi−1 + µi
2
− κi − κi−1
ν
+
µi − µi−1
ν
≤ v2i ν − λν, ∀i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1},
v21ν − λν − 
κ1 + µ1
2
− µ1 − κ1
ν
≥ 0,
v2Nν − λν − 
κN−1 + µN−1
2
+
µN−1 − κN−1
ν
≥ 0,
κi ≥ 0 and µi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
Complementary slackness of the primal problem suggests
that, for each i, either κi = 0 or µi = 0. Therefore, we seek
dual feasible solutions such that ηi = µi − κi and |ηi| =
µi + κi:
maximize
λ,{ηi}
λ
s.t. 
|ηi−1|+ |ηi|
2
+
ηi − ηi−1
ν
≤ v2i ν − λν,
∀i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1},
v21ν − λν − 
|η1|
2
− η1
ν
≥ 0,
v2Nν − λν − 
|ηN−1|
2
+
ηN−1
ν
≥ 0
We first set N = 2Mν + 1 and let M → ∞ and, then, let
ν → 0. The discritized dual problem convergences to the
continuous one:
maximize
λ∈R,η:C1(R→R)
λ
s.t. η′(v) + |η(v)| ≤ v2 − λ, ∀v ∈ R,
lim
v→∞ η(v) ≥ 0, limv→−∞ η(v) ≤ 0
The last step of the proof includes building a feasible dual
solution for λ = 2−δ2 , for small, positive values of δ.
Specifically, we fix λ = 2−δ2 and solve the initial value
problem:
η′(v) + |η(v)| = v2 − λ, and η(0) = 0 (19)
Existence and uniqueness of solutions for the initial value
problem (19) implies that the unique solution only needs to
be checked that it satisfy the boundary constraints. Some
technical analysis proves that, for small and positive values
of δ, the solution η to the initial value problem (19) indeed
v`3v`2v`1
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Fig. 3: The dual solution η for small values of δ. The function
η changes curvature at vˆ1, becomes increasing at vˆ2, and is zero
at vˆ3. For small values of δ, once η becomes positive, it remains
increasing and, thus, positive.
v 0 v1 v2 v3
η′′ − − 0 + + + + +
η′ − − − − 0 + + +
η 0 − − − − − 0 +
TABLE I: Elementary analysis on the behaviour of function η(v)
for small and positive values of δ.
satisfies the constraints:
lim
v→∞ η(v) ≥ 0 and limv→−∞ η(v) ≤ 0
Due to symmetry, we focus only on the case of v ≥ 0. Table
I summarizes the signs of η and its derivatives. Specifically,
the solution η is negative until vˆ3. While η remains negative,
it satisfies the initial value problem:
η′(v)− η(v) = v2 − λ and η(0) = 0
The single root of the second derivative is analytically
computed:
vˆ1 =
ln 2− ln δ

At vˆ3, the dual function η becomes positive and satisfies the
initial value problem (20):
η′(v) + η(v) = v2 − λ and η(vˆ3) = 0 (20)
The value vˆ3 can become arbitrarily large. Indeed, it holds
that vˆ3 ≥ vˆ1 and, for small enough values of δ, vˆ1 can
become as large as needed. Therefore, for small enough
values of δ, the derivative of Equation (20) remains positive:
η′(v) =
2(v− 1)
2
+
e(v3−v)(δ − 2v3+ v232)
2
≥ 0,
for v ≥ vˆ3.
The cost of the constructed dual feasible solution is λ =
2−δ
2 and can be made as close to the cost of the Laplace
distribution. Weak duality completes the proof.
Remark 2: For λ = 22 , we consider the dual solution
η(v) = − 12 v(|v| + 2) which satisfies the differential
equation. However, it fails to satisfy the boundary conditions
since it quadratically explodes. Instead, for λ > 22 , the
dual feasible explodes exponentially. Despite the qualitative
difference between the two cases, they are both infeasible.
